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void-packages/srcpkgs/pam_ssh_agent_auth/patches/openssl.patch

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From eef90424a0545b7b0125dfaf5e3cef3c5248ada0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Guido Falsi <mad@madpilot.net>
Date: Sat, 20 Oct 2018 14:29:43 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Adapt to OpenSSL 1.1.1.
The FreeBSD operating system is migrating to OpenSSL 1.1.1 and I have created this set of patches to make pam_ssh_agent_auth compile with it.
The patch comments out some parts of include files which are not actually used and reference now opaque OpenSSL internals.
I also have migrated the source files to use accessors to use the OpenSSL objects.
The patch works on FreeBSD head (will be 12.0) but the --without-openssl-header-check argument is required in configure there.
---
authfd.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++
bufbn.c | 4 ++
cipher.h | 6 ++-
kex.h | 9 +++-
key.c | 133 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
ssh-dss.c | 51 ++++++++++++++++----
ssh-ecdsa.c | 40 ++++++++++++----
ssh-rsa.c | 22 +++++++--
8 files changed, 287 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
diff --git a/authfd.c b/authfd.c
index 7b96921..35f8de1 100644
--- authfd.c
+++ authfd.c
@@ -372,6 +372,7 @@ ssh_get_next_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, char **comment, int versio
case 1:
key = pamsshagentauth_key_new(KEY_RSA1);
bits = pamsshagentauth_buffer_get_int(&auth->identities);
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
pamsshagentauth_buffer_get_bignum(&auth->identities, key->rsa->e);
pamsshagentauth_buffer_get_bignum(&auth->identities, key->rsa->n);
*comment = pamsshagentauth_buffer_get_string(&auth->identities, NULL);
@@ -379,6 +380,15 @@ ssh_get_next_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, char **comment, int versio
if (keybits < 0 || bits != (u_int)keybits)
pamsshagentauth_logit("Warning: identity keysize mismatch: actual %d, announced %u",
BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), bits);
+#else
+ pamsshagentauth_buffer_get_bignum(&auth->identities, RSA_get0_e(key->rsa));
+ pamsshagentauth_buffer_get_bignum(&auth->identities, RSA_get0_n(key->rsa));
+ *comment = pamsshagentauth_buffer_get_string(&auth->identities, NULL);
+ keybits = BN_num_bits(RSA_get0_n(key->rsa));
+ if (keybits < 0 || bits != (u_int)keybits)
+ pamsshagentauth_logit("Warning: identity keysize mismatch: actual %d, announced %u",
+ BN_num_bits(RSA_get0_n(key->rsa)), bits);
+#endif
break;
case 2:
blob = pamsshagentauth_buffer_get_string(&auth->identities, &blen);
@@ -422,9 +432,15 @@ ssh_decrypt_challenge(AuthenticationConnection *auth,
}
pamsshagentauth_buffer_init(&buffer);
pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_char(&buffer, SSH_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE);
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_int(&buffer, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n));
pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, key->rsa->e);
pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, key->rsa->n);
+#else
+ pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_int(&buffer, BN_num_bits(RSA_get0_n(key->rsa)));
+ pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, RSA_get0_e(key->rsa));
+ pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, RSA_get0_n(key->rsa));
+#endif
pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, challenge);
pamsshagentauth_buffer_append(&buffer, session_id, 16);
pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_int(&buffer, response_type);
@@ -501,6 +517,7 @@ ssh_agent_sign(AuthenticationConnection *auth,
static void
ssh_encode_identity_rsa1(Buffer *b, RSA *key, const char *comment)
{
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_int(b, BN_num_bits(key->n));
pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum(b, key->n);
pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum(b, key->e);
@@ -509,6 +526,16 @@ ssh_encode_identity_rsa1(Buffer *b, RSA *key, const char *comment)
pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum(b, key->iqmp); /* ssh key->u */
pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum(b, key->q); /* ssh key->p, SSL key->q */
pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum(b, key->p); /* ssh key->q, SSL key->p */
+#else
+ pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_int(b, BN_num_bits(RSA_get0_n(key)));
+ pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum(b, RSA_get0_n(key));
+ pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum(b, RSA_get0_e(key));
+ pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum(b, RSA_get0_d(key));
+ /* To keep within the protocol: p < q for ssh. in SSL p > q */
+ pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum(b, RSA_get0_iqmp(key)); /* ssh key->u */
+ pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum(b, RSA_get0_q(key)); /* ssh key->p, SSL key->q */
+ pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum(b, RSA_get0_p(key)); /* ssh key->q, SSL key->p */
+#endif
pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(b, comment);
}
@@ -518,19 +545,36 @@ ssh_encode_identity_ssh2(Buffer *b, Key *key, const char *comment)
pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(b, key_ssh_name(key));
switch (key->type) {
case KEY_RSA:
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->n);
pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->e);
pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->d);
pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->iqmp);
pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->p);
pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->q);
+#else
+ pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum2(b, RSA_get0_n(key->rsa));
+ pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum2(b, RSA_get0_e(key->rsa));
+ pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum2(b, RSA_get0_d(key->rsa));
+ pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum2(b, RSA_get0_iqmp(key->rsa));
+ pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum2(b, RSA_get0_p(key->rsa));
+ pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum2(b, RSA_get0_q(key->rsa));
+#endif
break;
case KEY_DSA:
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->p);
pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->q);
pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->g);
pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->pub_key);
pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->priv_key);
+#else
+ pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum2(b, DSA_get0_p(key->dsa));
+ pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum2(b, DSA_get0_q(key->dsa));
+ pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum2(b, DSA_get0_g(key->dsa));
+ pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum2(b, DSA_get0_pub_key(key->dsa));
+ pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum2(b, DSA_get0_priv_key(key->dsa));
+#endif
break;
}
pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(b, comment);
@@ -610,9 +654,15 @@ ssh_remove_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Key *key)
if (key->type == KEY_RSA1) {
pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_RSA_IDENTITY);
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_int(&msg, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n));
pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum(&msg, key->rsa->e);
pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum(&msg, key->rsa->n);
+#else
+ pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_int(&msg, BN_num_bits(RSA_get0_n(key->rsa)));
+ pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum(&msg, RSA_get0_e(key->rsa));
+ pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum(&msg, RSA_get0_n(key->rsa));
+#endif
} else if (key->type == KEY_DSA || key->type == KEY_RSA) {
pamsshagentauth_key_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen);
pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY);
diff --git a/bufbn.c b/bufbn.c
index 6a49c73..4ecedc1 100644
--- bufbn.c
+++ bufbn.c
@@ -151,7 +151,11 @@ pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum2_ret(Buffer *buffer, const BIGNUM *value)
pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_int(buffer, 0);
return 0;
}
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
if (value->neg) {
+#else
+ if (BN_is_negative(value)) {
+#endif
pamsshagentauth_logerror("buffer_put_bignum2_ret: negative numbers not supported");
return (-1);
}
diff --git a/cipher.h b/cipher.h
index 49bbc16..64f59ca 100644
--- cipher.h
+++ cipher.h
@@ -59,15 +59,18 @@
#define CIPHER_DECRYPT 0
typedef struct Cipher Cipher;
-typedef struct CipherContext CipherContext;
+// typedef struct CipherContext CipherContext;
struct Cipher;
+/*
struct CipherContext {
int plaintext;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX evp;
Cipher *cipher;
};
+*/
+/*
u_int cipher_mask_ssh1(int);
Cipher *cipher_by_name(const char *);
Cipher *cipher_by_number(int);
@@ -88,4 +91,5 @@ void cipher_set_keyiv(CipherContext *, u_char *);
int cipher_get_keyiv_len(const CipherContext *);
int cipher_get_keycontext(const CipherContext *, u_char *);
void cipher_set_keycontext(CipherContext *, u_char *);
+*/
#endif /* CIPHER_H */
diff --git a/kex.h b/kex.h
index 8e29c90..81ca57d 100644
--- kex.h
+++ kex.h
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ enum kex_exchange {
#define KEX_INIT_SENT 0x0001
typedef struct Kex Kex;
-typedef struct Mac Mac;
+// typedef struct Mac Mac;
typedef struct Comp Comp;
typedef struct Enc Enc;
typedef struct Newkeys Newkeys;
@@ -84,6 +84,7 @@ struct Enc {
u_char *key;
u_char *iv;
};
+/*
struct Mac {
char *name;
int enabled;
@@ -95,11 +96,13 @@ struct Mac {
HMAC_CTX evp_ctx;
struct umac_ctx *umac_ctx;
};
+*/
struct Comp {
int type;
int enabled;
char *name;
};
+/*
struct Newkeys {
Enc enc;
Mac mac;
@@ -126,7 +129,9 @@ struct Kex {
int (*host_key_index)(Key *);
void (*kex[KEX_MAX])(Kex *);
};
+*/
+/*
Kex *kex_setup(char *[PROPOSAL_MAX]);
void kex_finish(Kex *);
@@ -152,6 +157,8 @@ kexgex_hash(const EVP_MD *, char *, char *, char *, int, char *,
void
derive_ssh1_session_id(BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, u_int8_t[8], u_int8_t[16]);
+*/
+
#if defined(DEBUG_KEX) || defined(DEBUG_KEXDH)
void dump_digest(char *, u_char *, int);
#endif
diff --git a/key.c b/key.c
index 107a442..aedbbb5 100644
--- key.c
+++ key.c
@@ -77,15 +77,21 @@ pamsshagentauth_key_new(int type)
case KEY_RSA:
if ((rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL)
pamsshagentauth_fatal("key_new: RSA_new failed");
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
if ((rsa->n = BN_new()) == NULL)
pamsshagentauth_fatal("key_new: BN_new failed");
if ((rsa->e = BN_new()) == NULL)
pamsshagentauth_fatal("key_new: BN_new failed");
+#else
+ if (RSA_set0_key(rsa, BN_new(), BN_new(), NULL) != 1)
+ pamsshagentauth_fatal("key_new: RSA_set0_key failed");
+#endif
k->rsa = rsa;
break;
case KEY_DSA:
if ((dsa = DSA_new()) == NULL)
pamsshagentauth_fatal("key_new: DSA_new failed");
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
if ((dsa->p = BN_new()) == NULL)
pamsshagentauth_fatal("key_new: BN_new failed");
if ((dsa->q = BN_new()) == NULL)
@@ -94,6 +100,12 @@ pamsshagentauth_key_new(int type)
pamsshagentauth_fatal("key_new: BN_new failed");
if ((dsa->pub_key = BN_new()) == NULL)
pamsshagentauth_fatal("key_new: BN_new failed");
+#else
+ if (DSA_set0_pqg(dsa, BN_new(), BN_new(), BN_new()) != 1)
+ pamsshagentauth_fatal("key_new: DSA_set0_pqg failed");
+ if (DSA_set0_key(dsa, BN_new(), NULL) != 1)
+ pamsshagentauth_fatal("key_new: DSA_set0_key failed");
+#endif
k->dsa = dsa;
break;
case KEY_ECDSA:
@@ -118,6 +130,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_key_new_private(int type)
switch (k->type) {
case KEY_RSA1:
case KEY_RSA:
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
if ((k->rsa->d = BN_new()) == NULL)
pamsshagentauth_fatal("key_new_private: BN_new failed");
if ((k->rsa->iqmp = BN_new()) == NULL)
@@ -130,14 +143,30 @@ pamsshagentauth_key_new_private(int type)
pamsshagentauth_fatal("key_new_private: BN_new failed");
if ((k->rsa->dmp1 = BN_new()) == NULL)
pamsshagentauth_fatal("key_new_private: BN_new failed");
+#else
+ if (RSA_set0_key(k->rsa, NULL, NULL, BN_new()) != 1)
+ pamsshagentauth_fatal("key_new: RSA_set0_key failed");
+ if (RSA_set0_crt_params(k->rsa, BN_new(), BN_new(), BN_new()) != 1)
+ pamsshagentauth_fatal("key_new: RSA_set0_crt_params failed");
+ if (RSA_set0_factors(k->rsa, BN_new(), BN_new()) != 1)
+ pamsshagentauth_fatal("key_new: RSA_set0_factors failed");
+#endif
break;
case KEY_DSA:
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
if ((k->dsa->priv_key = BN_new()) == NULL)
pamsshagentauth_fatal("key_new_private: BN_new failed");
+#else
+ if (DSA_set0_key(k->dsa, NULL, BN_new()) != 1)
+ pamsshagentauth_fatal("key_new_private: DSA_set0_key failed");
+#endif
break;
case KEY_ECDSA:
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
if (EC_KEY_set_private_key(k->ecdsa, BN_new()) != 1)
pamsshagentauth_fatal("key_new_private: EC_KEY_set_private_key failed");
+#else
+#endif
break;
case KEY_ED25519:
RAND_bytes(k->ed25519->sk, sizeof(k->ed25519->sk));
@@ -195,14 +224,26 @@ pamsshagentauth_key_equal(const Key *a, const Key *b)
case KEY_RSA1:
case KEY_RSA:
return a->rsa != NULL && b->rsa != NULL &&
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
BN_cmp(a->rsa->e, b->rsa->e) == 0 &&
BN_cmp(a->rsa->n, b->rsa->n) == 0;
+#else
+ BN_cmp(RSA_get0_e(a->rsa), RSA_get0_e(b->rsa)) == 0 &&
+ BN_cmp(RSA_get0_n(a->rsa), RSA_get0_n(b->rsa)) == 0;
+#endif
case KEY_DSA:
return a->dsa != NULL && b->dsa != NULL &&
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
BN_cmp(a->dsa->p, b->dsa->p) == 0 &&
BN_cmp(a->dsa->q, b->dsa->q) == 0 &&
BN_cmp(a->dsa->g, b->dsa->g) == 0 &&
BN_cmp(a->dsa->pub_key, b->dsa->pub_key) == 0;
+#else
+ BN_cmp(DSA_get0_p(a->dsa), DSA_get0_p(b->dsa)) == 0 &&
+ BN_cmp(DSA_get0_q(a->dsa), DSA_get0_q(b->dsa)) == 0 &&
+ BN_cmp(DSA_get0_g(a->dsa), DSA_get0_g(b->dsa)) == 0 &&
+ BN_cmp(DSA_get0_pub_key(a->dsa), DSA_get0_pub_key(b->dsa)) == 0;
+#endif
case KEY_ECDSA:
return a->ecdsa != NULL && b->ecdsa != NULL &&
EC_KEY_check_key(a->ecdsa) == 1 &&
@@ -231,7 +272,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_key_fingerprint_raw(const Key *k, enum fp_type dgst_type,
u_int *dgst_raw_length)
{
const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
- EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
+ EVP_MD_CTX *ctx;
u_char *blob = NULL;
u_char *retval = NULL;
u_int len = 0;
@@ -252,12 +293,21 @@ pamsshagentauth_key_fingerprint_raw(const Key *k, enum fp_type dgst_type,
}
switch (k->type) {
case KEY_RSA1:
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
nlen = BN_num_bytes(k->rsa->n);
elen = BN_num_bytes(k->rsa->e);
len = nlen + elen;
blob = pamsshagentauth_xmalloc(len);
BN_bn2bin(k->rsa->n, blob);
BN_bn2bin(k->rsa->e, blob + nlen);
+#else
+ nlen = BN_num_bytes(RSA_get0_n(k->rsa));
+ elen = BN_num_bytes(RSA_get0_e(k->rsa));
+ len = nlen + elen;
+ blob = pamsshagentauth_xmalloc(len);
+ BN_bn2bin(RSA_get0_n(k->rsa), blob);
+ BN_bn2bin(RSA_get0_e(k->rsa), blob + nlen);
+#endif
break;
case KEY_DSA:
case KEY_ECDSA:
@@ -273,11 +323,14 @@ pamsshagentauth_key_fingerprint_raw(const Key *k, enum fp_type dgst_type,
}
if (blob != NULL) {
retval = pamsshagentauth_xmalloc(EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
- EVP_DigestInit(&ctx, md);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, blob, len);
- EVP_DigestFinal(&ctx, retval, dgst_raw_length);
+ /* XXX Errors from EVP_* functions are not hadled */
+ ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
+ EVP_DigestInit(ctx, md);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, blob, len);
+ EVP_DigestFinal(ctx, retval, dgst_raw_length);
memset(blob, 0, len);
pamsshagentauth_xfree(blob);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ctx);
} else {
pamsshagentauth_fatal("key_fingerprint_raw: blob is null");
}
@@ -457,10 +510,17 @@ pamsshagentauth_key_read(Key *ret, char **cpp)
return -1;
*cpp = cp;
/* Get public exponent, public modulus. */
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
if (!read_bignum(cpp, ret->rsa->e))
return -1;
if (!read_bignum(cpp, ret->rsa->n))
return -1;
+#else
+ if (!read_bignum(cpp, RSA_get0_e(ret->rsa)))
+ return -1;
+ if (!read_bignum(cpp, RSA_get0_n(ret->rsa)))
+ return -1;
+#endif
success = 1;
break;
case KEY_UNSPEC:
@@ -583,10 +643,17 @@ pamsshagentauth_key_write(const Key *key, FILE *f)
if (key->type == KEY_RSA1 && key->rsa != NULL) {
/* size of modulus 'n' */
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
bits = BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n);
fprintf(f, "%u", bits);
if (write_bignum(f, key->rsa->e) &&
write_bignum(f, key->rsa->n)) {
+#else
+ bits = BN_num_bits(RSA_get0_n(key->rsa));
+ fprintf(f, "%u", bits);
+ if (write_bignum(f, RSA_get0_e(key->rsa)) &&
+ write_bignum(f, RSA_get0_n(key->rsa))) {
+#endif
success = 1;
} else {
pamsshagentauth_logerror("key_write: failed for RSA key");
@@ -675,10 +742,17 @@ pamsshagentauth_key_size(const Key *k)
{
switch (k->type) {
case KEY_RSA1:
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
case KEY_RSA:
return BN_num_bits(k->rsa->n);
case KEY_DSA:
return BN_num_bits(k->dsa->p);
+#else
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ return BN_num_bits(RSA_get0_n(k->rsa));
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ return BN_num_bits(DSA_get0_p(k->dsa));
+#endif
case KEY_ECDSA:
{
int nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(k->ecdsa));
@@ -769,17 +843,29 @@ pamsshagentauth_key_from_private(const Key *k)
switch (k->type) {
case KEY_DSA:
n = pamsshagentauth_key_new(k->type);
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
if ((BN_copy(n->dsa->p, k->dsa->p) == NULL) ||
(BN_copy(n->dsa->q, k->dsa->q) == NULL) ||
(BN_copy(n->dsa->g, k->dsa->g) == NULL) ||
(BN_copy(n->dsa->pub_key, k->dsa->pub_key) == NULL))
+#else
+ if ((BN_copy(DSA_get0_p(n->dsa), DSA_get0_p(k->dsa)) == NULL) ||
+ (BN_copy(DSA_get0_q(n->dsa), DSA_get0_q(k->dsa)) == NULL) ||
+ (BN_copy(DSA_get0_g(n->dsa), DSA_get0_g(k->dsa)) == NULL) ||
+ (BN_copy(DSA_get0_pub_key(n->dsa), DSA_get0_pub_key(k->dsa)) == NULL))
+#endif
pamsshagentauth_fatal("key_from_private: BN_copy failed");
break;
case KEY_RSA:
case KEY_RSA1:
n = pamsshagentauth_key_new(k->type);
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
if ((BN_copy(n->rsa->n, k->rsa->n) == NULL) ||
(BN_copy(n->rsa->e, k->rsa->e) == NULL))
+#else
+ if ((BN_copy(RSA_get0_n(n->rsa), RSA_get0_n(k->rsa)) == NULL) ||
+ (BN_copy(RSA_get0_e(n->rsa), RSA_get0_e(k->rsa)) == NULL))
+#endif
pamsshagentauth_fatal("key_from_private: BN_copy failed");
break;
case KEY_ECDSA:
@@ -881,8 +967,13 @@ pamsshagentauth_key_from_blob(const u_char *blob, u_int blen)
switch (type) {
case KEY_RSA:
key = pamsshagentauth_key_new(type);
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
if (pamsshagentauth_buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&b, key->rsa->e) == -1 ||
pamsshagentauth_buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&b, key->rsa->n) == -1) {
+#else
+ if (pamsshagentauth_buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&b, RSA_get0_e(key->rsa)) == -1 ||
+ pamsshagentauth_buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&b, RSA_get0_n(key->rsa)) == -1) {
+#endif
pamsshagentauth_logerror("key_from_blob: can't read rsa key");
pamsshagentauth_key_free(key);
key = NULL;
@@ -894,10 +985,17 @@ pamsshagentauth_key_from_blob(const u_char *blob, u_int blen)
break;
case KEY_DSA:
key = pamsshagentauth_key_new(type);
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
if (pamsshagentauth_buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&b, key->dsa->p) == -1 ||
pamsshagentauth_buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&b, key->dsa->q) == -1 ||
pamsshagentauth_buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&b, key->dsa->g) == -1 ||
pamsshagentauth_buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&b, key->dsa->pub_key) == -1) {
+#else
+ if (pamsshagentauth_buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&b, DSA_get0_p(key->dsa)) == -1 ||
+ pamsshagentauth_buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&b, DSA_get0_q(key->dsa)) == -1 ||
+ pamsshagentauth_buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&b, DSA_get0_g(key->dsa)) == -1 ||
+ pamsshagentauth_buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&b, DSA_get0_pub_key(key->dsa)) == -1) {
+#endif
pamsshagentauth_logerror("key_from_blob: can't read dsa key");
pamsshagentauth_key_free(key);
key = NULL;
@@ -1015,6 +1113,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_key_to_blob(const Key *key, u_char **blobp, u_int *lenp)
}
pamsshagentauth_buffer_init(&b);
switch (key->type) {
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
case KEY_DSA:
pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(&b, key_ssh_name(key));
pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum2(&b, key->dsa->p);
@@ -1027,6 +1126,20 @@ pamsshagentauth_key_to_blob(const Key *key, u_char **blobp, u_int *lenp)
pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum2(&b, key->rsa->e);
pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum2(&b, key->rsa->n);
break;
+#else
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(&b, key_ssh_name(key));
+ pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum2(&b, DSA_get0_p(key->dsa));
+ pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum2(&b, DSA_get0_q(key->dsa));
+ pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum2(&b, DSA_get0_g(key->dsa));
+ pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum2(&b, DSA_get0_pub_key(key->dsa));
+ break;
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(&b, key_ssh_name(key));
+ pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum2(&b, RSA_get0_e(key->rsa));
+ pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_bignum2(&b, RSA_get0_n(key->rsa));
+ break;
+#endif
case KEY_ECDSA:
{
size_t l = 0;
@@ -1138,14 +1251,20 @@ pamsshagentauth_key_demote(const Key *k)
case KEY_RSA:
if ((pk->rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL)
pamsshagentauth_fatal("key_demote: RSA_new failed");
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
if ((pk->rsa->e = BN_dup(k->rsa->e)) == NULL)
pamsshagentauth_fatal("key_demote: BN_dup failed");
if ((pk->rsa->n = BN_dup(k->rsa->n)) == NULL)
pamsshagentauth_fatal("key_demote: BN_dup failed");
+#else
+ if (RSA_set0_key(pk->rsa, BN_dup(RSA_get0_n(k->rsa)), BN_dup(RSA_get0_e(k->rsa)), NULL) != 1)
+ pamsshagentauth_fatal("key_demote: RSA_set0_key failed");
+#endif
break;
case KEY_DSA:
if ((pk->dsa = DSA_new()) == NULL)
pamsshagentauth_fatal("key_demote: DSA_new failed");
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
if ((pk->dsa->p = BN_dup(k->dsa->p)) == NULL)
pamsshagentauth_fatal("key_demote: BN_dup failed");
if ((pk->dsa->q = BN_dup(k->dsa->q)) == NULL)
@@ -1154,6 +1273,12 @@ pamsshagentauth_key_demote(const Key *k)
pamsshagentauth_fatal("key_demote: BN_dup failed");
if ((pk->dsa->pub_key = BN_dup(k->dsa->pub_key)) == NULL)
pamsshagentauth_fatal("key_demote: BN_dup failed");
+#else
+ if (DSA_set0_pqg(pk->dsa, BN_dup(DSA_get0_p(k->dsa)), BN_dup(DSA_get0_q(k->dsa)), BN_dup(DSA_get0_g(k->dsa))) != 1)
+ pamsshagentauth_fatal("key_demote: DSA_set0_pqg failed");
+ if (DSA_set0_key(pk->dsa, BN_dup(DSA_get0_pub_key(k->dsa)), NULL) != 1)
+ pamsshagentauth_fatal("key_demote: DSA_set0_key failed");
+#endif
break;
case KEY_ECDSA:
pamsshagentauth_fatal("key_demote: implement me");
diff --git a/ssh-dss.c b/ssh-dss.c
index 9fdaa5d..1051ae2 100644
--- ssh-dss.c
+++ ssh-dss.c
@@ -48,37 +48,53 @@ ssh_dss_sign(const Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
{
DSA_SIG *sig;
const EVP_MD *evp_md = EVP_sha1();
- EVP_MD_CTX md;
+ EVP_MD_CTX *md;
u_char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], sigblob[SIGBLOB_LEN];
u_int rlen, slen, len, dlen;
Buffer b;
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
+ const BIGNUM *r, *s;
+#endif
if (key == NULL || key->type != KEY_DSA || key->dsa == NULL) {
pamsshagentauth_logerror("ssh_dss_sign: no DSA key");
return -1;
}
- EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, data, datalen);
- EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, &dlen);
+ md = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
+ EVP_DigestInit(md, evp_md);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(md, data, datalen);
+ EVP_DigestFinal(md, digest, &dlen);
sig = DSA_do_sign(digest, dlen, key->dsa);
memset(digest, 'd', sizeof(digest));
+ EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(md);
if (sig == NULL) {
pamsshagentauth_logerror("ssh_dss_sign: sign failed");
return -1;
}
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
rlen = BN_num_bytes(sig->r);
slen = BN_num_bytes(sig->s);
+#else
+ DSA_SIG_get0((const DSA_SIG *)sig, (const BIGNUM **)r, (const BIGNUM **)s);
+ rlen = BN_num_bytes(r);
+ slen = BN_num_bytes(s);
+#endif
if (rlen > INTBLOB_LEN || slen > INTBLOB_LEN) {
pamsshagentauth_logerror("bad sig size %u %u", rlen, slen);
DSA_SIG_free(sig);
return -1;
}
memset(sigblob, 0, SIGBLOB_LEN);
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
BN_bn2bin(sig->r, sigblob+ SIGBLOB_LEN - INTBLOB_LEN - rlen);
BN_bn2bin(sig->s, sigblob+ SIGBLOB_LEN - slen);
+#else
+ BN_bn2bin(r, sigblob+ SIGBLOB_LEN - INTBLOB_LEN - rlen);
+ BN_bn2bin(s, sigblob+ SIGBLOB_LEN - slen);
+#endif
DSA_SIG_free(sig);
if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB) {
@@ -110,11 +126,14 @@ ssh_dss_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *signature, u_int signaturelen,
{
DSA_SIG *sig;
const EVP_MD *evp_md = EVP_sha1();
- EVP_MD_CTX md;
+ EVP_MD_CTX *md;
u_char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], *sigblob;
u_int len, dlen;
int rlen, ret;
Buffer b;
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
+ BIGNUM *r, *s;
+#endif
if (key == NULL || key->type != KEY_DSA || key->dsa == NULL) {
pamsshagentauth_logerror("ssh_dss_verify: no DSA key");
@@ -157,6 +176,7 @@ ssh_dss_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *signature, u_int signaturelen,
/* parse signature */
if ((sig = DSA_SIG_new()) == NULL)
pamsshagentauth_fatal("ssh_dss_verify: DSA_SIG_new failed");
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
if ((sig->r = BN_new()) == NULL)
pamsshagentauth_fatal("ssh_dss_verify: BN_new failed");
if ((sig->s = BN_new()) == NULL)
@@ -164,18 +184,33 @@ ssh_dss_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *signature, u_int signaturelen,
if ((BN_bin2bn(sigblob, INTBLOB_LEN, sig->r) == NULL) ||
(BN_bin2bn(sigblob+ INTBLOB_LEN, INTBLOB_LEN, sig->s) == NULL))
pamsshagentauth_fatal("ssh_dss_verify: BN_bin2bn failed");
+#else
+ if ((r = BN_new()) == NULL)
+ pamsshagentauth_fatal("ssh_dss_verify: BN_new failed");
+ if ((s = BN_new()) == NULL)
+ pamsshagentauth_fatal("ssh_dss_verify: BN_new failed");
+ if (DSA_SIG_set0(sig, r, s) != 1)
+ pamsshagentauth_fatal("ssh_dss_verify: DSA_SIG_set0 failed");
+ if ((BN_bin2bn(sigblob, INTBLOB_LEN, r) == NULL) ||
+ (BN_bin2bn(sigblob+ INTBLOB_LEN, INTBLOB_LEN, s) == NULL))
+ pamsshagentauth_fatal("ssh_dss_verify: BN_bin2bn failed");
+ if (DSA_SIG_set0(sig, r, s) != 1)
+ pamsshagentauth_fatal("ssh_dss_verify: DSA_SIG_set0 failed");
+#endif
/* clean up */
memset(sigblob, 0, len);
pamsshagentauth_xfree(sigblob);
/* sha1 the data */
- EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, data, datalen);
- EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, &dlen);
+ md = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
+ EVP_DigestInit(md, evp_md);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(md, data, datalen);
+ EVP_DigestFinal(md, digest, &dlen);
ret = DSA_do_verify(digest, dlen, sig, key->dsa);
memset(digest, 'd', sizeof(digest));
+ EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(md);
DSA_SIG_free(sig);
diff --git a/ssh-ecdsa.c b/ssh-ecdsa.c
index efa0f3d..c213959 100644
--- ssh-ecdsa.c
+++ ssh-ecdsa.c
@@ -41,22 +41,27 @@ ssh_ecdsa_sign(const Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
{
ECDSA_SIG *sig;
const EVP_MD *evp_md = evp_from_key(key);
- EVP_MD_CTX md;
+ EVP_MD_CTX *md;
u_char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
u_int len, dlen;
Buffer b, bb;
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
+ BIGNUM *r, *s;
+#endif
if (key == NULL || key->type != KEY_ECDSA || key->ecdsa == NULL) {
pamsshagentauth_logerror("ssh_ecdsa_sign: no ECDSA key");
return -1;
}
- EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, data, datalen);
- EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, &dlen);
+ md = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
+ EVP_DigestInit(md, evp_md);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(md, data, datalen);
+ EVP_DigestFinal(md, digest, &dlen);
sig = ECDSA_do_sign(digest, dlen, key->ecdsa);
memset(digest, 'd', sizeof(digest));
+ EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(md);
if (sig == NULL) {
pamsshagentauth_logerror("ssh_ecdsa_sign: sign failed");
@@ -64,8 +69,14 @@ ssh_ecdsa_sign(const Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
}
pamsshagentauth_buffer_init(&bb);
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
if (pamsshagentauth_buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&bb, sig->r) == -1 ||
pamsshagentauth_buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&bb, sig->s) == -1) {
+#else
+ DSA_SIG_get0(sig, &r, &s);
+ if (pamsshagentauth_buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&bb, r) == -1 ||
+ pamsshagentauth_buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&bb, s) == -1) {
+#endif
pamsshagentauth_logerror("couldn't serialize signature");
ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
return -1;
@@ -94,11 +105,14 @@ ssh_ecdsa_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *signature, u_int signaturelen,
{
ECDSA_SIG *sig;
const EVP_MD *evp_md = evp_from_key(key);
- EVP_MD_CTX md;
+ EVP_MD_CTX *md;
u_char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], *sigblob;
u_int len, dlen;
int rlen, ret;
Buffer b;
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
+ BIGNUM *r, *s;
+#endif
if (key == NULL || key->type != KEY_ECDSA || key->ecdsa == NULL) {
pamsshagentauth_logerror("ssh_ecdsa_sign: no ECDSA key");
@@ -127,8 +141,14 @@ ssh_ecdsa_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *signature, u_int signaturelen,
pamsshagentauth_buffer_init(&b);
pamsshagentauth_buffer_append(&b, sigblob, len);
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
if ((pamsshagentauth_buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&b, sig->r) == -1) ||
(pamsshagentauth_buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&b, sig->s) == -1))
+#else
+ DSA_SIG_get0(sig, &r, &s);
+ if ((pamsshagentauth_buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&b, r) == -1) ||
+ (pamsshagentauth_buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&b, s) == -1))
+#endif
pamsshagentauth_fatal("ssh_ecdsa_verify:"
"pamsshagentauth_buffer_get_bignum2_ret failed");
@@ -137,16 +157,18 @@ ssh_ecdsa_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *signature, u_int signaturelen,
pamsshagentauth_xfree(sigblob);
/* sha256 the data */
- EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, data, datalen);
- EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, &dlen);
+ md = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
+ EVP_DigestInit(md, evp_md);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(md, data, datalen);
+ EVP_DigestFinal(md, digest, &dlen);
ret = ECDSA_do_verify(digest, dlen, sig, key->ecdsa);
memset(digest, 'd', sizeof(digest));
+ EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(md);
ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
pamsshagentauth_verbose("ssh_ecdsa_verify: signature %s",
ret == 1 ? "correct" : ret == 0 ? "incorrect" : "error");
return ret;
-}
\ No newline at end of file
+}
diff --git a/ssh-rsa.c b/ssh-rsa.c
index d05844b..9d74eb6 100644
--- ssh-rsa.c
+++ ssh-rsa.c
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ ssh_rsa_sign(const Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
{
const EVP_MD *evp_md;
- EVP_MD_CTX md;
+ EVP_MD_CTX *md;
u_char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], *sig;
u_int slen, dlen, len;
int ok, nid;
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ ssh_rsa_sign(const Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
pamsshagentauth_logerror("ssh_rsa_sign: EVP_get_digestbynid %d failed", nid);
return -1;
}
+ md = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, data, datalen);
EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, &dlen);
@@ -64,6 +65,7 @@ ssh_rsa_sign(const Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
ok = RSA_sign(nid, digest, dlen, sig, &len, key->rsa);
memset(digest, 'd', sizeof(digest));
+ EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(md);
if (ok != 1) {
int ecode = ERR_get_error();
@@ -107,7 +109,7 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *signature, u_int signaturelen,
{
Buffer b;
const EVP_MD *evp_md;
- EVP_MD_CTX md;
+ EVP_MD_CTX *md;
char *ktype;
u_char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], *sigblob;
u_int len, dlen, modlen;
@@ -117,9 +119,17 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *signature, u_int signaturelen,
pamsshagentauth_logerror("ssh_rsa_verify: no RSA key");
return -1;
}
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
if (BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) {
+#else
+ if (BN_num_bits(RSA_get0_n(key->rsa)) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) {
+#endif
pamsshagentauth_logerror("ssh_rsa_verify: RSA modulus too small: %d < minimum %d bits",
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE);
+#else
+ BN_num_bits(RSA_get0_n(key->rsa)), SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE);
+#endif
return -1;
}
pamsshagentauth_buffer_init(&b);
@@ -161,12 +171,14 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *signature, u_int signaturelen,
pamsshagentauth_xfree(sigblob);
return -1;
}
- EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, data, datalen);
- EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, &dlen);
+ md = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
+ EVP_DigestInit(md, evp_md);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(md, data, datalen);
+ EVP_DigestFinal(md, digest, &dlen);
ret = openssh_RSA_verify(nid, digest, dlen, sigblob, len, key->rsa);
memset(digest, 'd', sizeof(digest));
+ EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(md);
memset(sigblob, 's', len);
pamsshagentauth_xfree(sigblob);
pamsshagentauth_verbose("ssh_rsa_verify: signature %scorrect", (ret==0) ? "in" : "");
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