void-packages/srcpkgs/electron19/files/musl-patches/chromium-musl-sandbox.patch

93 lines
3.8 KiB
Diff

--- ./sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_parameters_restrictions.cc.orig 2019-07-03 11:53:21.213479736 -0400
+++ ./sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_parameters_restrictions.cc 2019-07-03 11:57:01.304998253 -0400
@@ -140,31 +140,14 @@
ResultExpr RestrictCloneToThreadsAndEPERMFork() {
const Arg<unsigned long> flags(0);
- // TODO(mdempsky): Extend DSL to support (flags & ~mask1) == mask2.
- const uint64_t kAndroidCloneMask = CLONE_VM | CLONE_FS | CLONE_FILES |
- CLONE_SIGHAND | CLONE_THREAD |
- CLONE_SYSVSEM;
- const uint64_t kObsoleteAndroidCloneMask = kAndroidCloneMask | CLONE_DETACHED;
+ const int required = CLONE_VM | CLONE_FS | CLONE_FILES | CLONE_SIGHAND |
+ CLONE_THREAD | CLONE_SYSVSEM;
+ const int safe = CLONE_SETTLS | CLONE_PARENT_SETTID | CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID |
+ CLONE_DETACHED;
+ const BoolExpr thread_clone_ok = (flags&~safe)==required;
- const uint64_t kGlibcPthreadFlags =
- CLONE_VM | CLONE_FS | CLONE_FILES | CLONE_SIGHAND | CLONE_THREAD |
- CLONE_SYSVSEM | CLONE_SETTLS | CLONE_PARENT_SETTID | CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID;
- const BoolExpr glibc_test = flags == kGlibcPthreadFlags;
-
- const BoolExpr android_test =
- AnyOf(flags == kAndroidCloneMask, flags == kObsoleteAndroidCloneMask,
- flags == kGlibcPthreadFlags);
-
- // The following two flags are the two important flags in any vfork-emulating
- // clone call. EPERM any clone call that contains both of them.
- const uint64_t kImportantCloneVforkFlags = CLONE_VFORK | CLONE_VM;
-
- const BoolExpr is_fork_or_clone_vfork =
- AnyOf((flags & (CLONE_VM | CLONE_THREAD)) == 0,
- (flags & kImportantCloneVforkFlags) == kImportantCloneVforkFlags);
-
- return If(IsAndroid() ? android_test : glibc_test, Allow())
- .ElseIf(is_fork_or_clone_vfork, Error(EPERM))
+ return If(thread_clone_ok, Allow())
+ .ElseIf((flags & (CLONE_VM | CLONE_THREAD)) == 0, Error(EPERM))
.Else(CrashSIGSYSClone());
}
--- ./sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_sets.cc.orig
+++ ./sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_sets.cc
@@ -494,6 +494,7 @@
case __NR_mlock:
case __NR_munlock:
case __NR_munmap:
+ case __NR_mremap:
return true;
case __NR_madvise:
case __NR_mincore:
@@ -509,7 +510,6 @@
case __NR_modify_ldt:
#endif
case __NR_mprotect:
- case __NR_mremap:
case __NR_msync:
case __NR_munlockall:
case __NR_readahead:
diff --git a/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_sets.cc b/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_sets.cc
index 80f02c0..21fbe21 100644
--- sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_sets.cc
+++ sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf-helpers/syscall_sets.cc
@@ -373,6 +373,7 @@ bool SyscallSets::IsAllowedProcessStartOrDeath(int sysno) {
#if defined(__i386__)
case __NR_waitpid:
#endif
+ case __NR_set_tid_address:
return true;
case __NR_clone: // Should be parameter-restricted.
case __NR_setns: // Privileged.
@@ -385,7 +386,6 @@ bool SyscallSets::IsAllowedProcessStartOrDeath(int sysno) {
#if defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__) || defined(__mips__)
case __NR_set_thread_area:
#endif
- case __NR_set_tid_address:
case __NR_unshare:
#if !defined(__mips__) && !defined(__aarch64__)
case __NR_vfork:
--- sandbox/policy/linux/bpf_renderer_policy_linux.cc
+++ sandbox/policy/linux/bpf_renderer_policy_linux.cc
@@ -100,9 +100,9 @@
case __NR_uname:
case __NR_sched_getparam:
case __NR_sched_getscheduler:
+ case __NR_sched_setscheduler:
return Allow();
case __NR_sched_getaffinity:
- case __NR_sched_setscheduler:
return RestrictSchedTarget(GetPolicyPid(), sysno);
case __NR_prlimit64:
// See crbug.com/662450 and setrlimit comment above.